STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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# NATO'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES N. FLOWERS
United States Marine Corps

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# NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative: A Strategic Analysis

by

Lieutenant Colonel James N. Flowers
United States Marine Corps

Colonel E.G. Murdock

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel James N. Flowers

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NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) is a program to ensure that the Alliance has conventional military forces that are designed and equipped for 21st Century missions. The Alliance launched the program to develop allied defensive capabilities in five areas. The areas identified for focus are: effective engagement; deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; survivability; and command, control, and communications.

An analysis of the DCI will determine if the areas identified for focus are considered clear objectives by Alliance nations; what the priorities are for attainment of these objectives; Alliance management and structure to attain these objectives (analyze High Level Steering Group (HLSG) oversight); and resource allocation/management toward objectives. This analysis will conclude that the DCI objectives are either attainable or unattainable. Based on this analysis, adjustments to enable attainment will be recommended and causes for possible failure will be identified.

Additionally, a short discussion on the DCI objectives and the Army's Objective Force will illuminate that without timely attainment of the DCI objectives the military capabilities gap between the U.S. and NATO Europe will grow exponentially.

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# NATO'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

> .....there is no one set formula for increasing allied contributions to collective security that is appropriate for all allied nations. The United States will continue to encourage our allies and partners to assume greater share of the burden of providing for the common defense using approaches tailored to the circumstances of particular nations or groups of Nations. The launching of NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) is an important step in that direction.[1]
>
> --Responsibility Sharing Report

## INTRODUCTION

The idea to improve the defense capabilities of NATO was initiated by the U.S. at the June 1998 NATO Defense Ministerial in Brussels. Emphasizing the lessons learned from the NATO operation in Bosnia it was realized that future NATO operations in Europe would require deployable, mobile, and survivable troops. Most likely these troops would be required on a moments notice, possibly outside NATO boundaries, and receive no host nation support.

At the April 1999 Washington Summit NATO leaders adopted a plan to improve the defense capabilities of NATO. Part of this plan was the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The Allies agreed to pursue improved defense capabilities in five functional areas: effective engagement; deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; survivability; and command, control, and communications. The Allies also established a High Level Steering Group (HLSG) to supervise implementation of the DCI and to coordinate, prioritize, and harmonize the work of NATO's defense related committees.[2]

Additionally, all of the capabilities identified for improvement by the DCI were validated and further emphasized during Operation Allied Force (NATO war in Kosovo). This was NATO's first war, and from victory many lessons were learned. With the adoption of the DCI these hard fought lessons will not be forgotten, but used to improve the warfighting capabilities of the Alliance.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze execution of the DCI. It will provide insight into the clarity and emphasis the Alliance has put on this initiative, it will examine the priority the Alliance has placed on it, and it will analyze resource application to the DCI. Furthermore, it will discuss the ramifications of not attaining the objectives of the DCI and the growing capabilities gap between U.S. NATO and European NATO.

## ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF NATO'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE (DCI) CLEAR TO ALLIANCE NATIONS?

There is no single, comprehensive indicator that reflects all of the factors that determine military capability.[3] With no comprehensive indicator to determine military capability, objectives for attainment of specific military capabilities may differ from one NATO nation to the next. Objectives of military capabilities among allies must be made clear in order to attain appropriate capabilities and conduct integrated/synergistic operations. How are the military objectives focused on in NATO's DCI made clear to the alliance?

Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end of the Cold War was reflected in the Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept. There have, however, been further profound political and security developments since then. At their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance's new Strategic Concept.[4] The fact that NATO had not drafted a new Strategic Concept since 1991 makes clear that international leaders more clearly recognized the requirements facing a post-Cold War alliance and applied political will in the form of support for a concept to meet new strategic objectives. Of significance in this Strategic Concept are the Guidelines For The Alliance's Force Posture. Guidelines for the Alliance's force posture means, in particular, that overall the Alliance will, in both the near and long term and for the full range of its missions, require essential operational capabilities. These include an effective engagement capability, deployability and mobility, survivability of forces and infrastructure, and sustainability, incorporating logistics and force rotation. Sufficient capabilities in the areas of command, control, and communications as well as intelligence and surveillance will serve as necessary force multipliers.[5] These guidelines do not specifically address the essential operational capabilities of the DCI however, they are none-the-less the same required capabilities clearly addressed and further defined in the separate DCI document.

The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) is an agreement by Alliance nations to pursue conventional military force capabilities that are relevant in the successful conduct of 21st century missions. At the April 1999 Washington Summit NATO's nineteen leaders adopted a common operational vision for NATO militaries and launched a program to develop Allied defense capabilities in five specific areas. The areas identified for DCI focus are:

**-Effective engagement:** the ability to engage effectively and with appropriate assets in a number of different areas, including humanitarian assistance, force protection, and high-intensity combat;

**-Deployability and mobility:** the ability to move forces efficiently and effectively;

**-Sustainability and logistics:** the ability to sustain engagements by delivering supplies and support equipment in a timely, organized manner, supporting prolonged operations through rotation of forces;

**-Survivability:** the ability to survive and operate in a wide range of environments, including chemical, biological, terrorist, or electronic attacks;

**-Command, Control and Communications:** the ability to establish and maintain effective command and control arrangements and communications links, interoperable with national systems and including a deployable capability for crisis response operations.[6]

The specific operational capabilities required of the DCI are clearly outlined above and are supported by definitions and descriptions that add further depth to the comprehension and clarity of the objectives of the DCI. NATO's DCI continues to be widely published and promulgated and the more leaders and national decision makers that understand the DCI the more clear objectives and requirements for attainment will become.

In addition to references specifically mentioning and clarifying the DCI objectives, references to modernization, restructuring and adaptation for NATO forces often infer the DCI objectives. For instance to answer the question: "In what ways should future forces change?" The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) says: "Certainly they have to be smaller, more mobile, more rapidly deployable. Yet they have to be more potent, more capable of achieving decisive effects."[7] With no reference to or association with NATO or DCI the SSI has emphasized and possibly further clarified three objectives of DCI. This type of independent analysis reinforces the intellectual architecture of the DCI and helps bring clarity to its areas of focus and objectives.

Have the lessons learned from NATO's Operation Allied Force, the war in Kosovo, reinforced the DCI?

> The DCI had been under discussion before Operation Allied Force. However, the shortcomings exposed during the campaign gave the initiative more impetus. "Post-Kosovo people are taking the DCI much more seriously," officials said.[8]
>
> --Jim Garamone, Defense Link, American Forces Information Service

While still under analysis, NATO leaders and military strategists are studying Operation Allied Force in order to determine the warfighting capabilities required of the Alliance in the future. While our NATO partners contributed significantly to the military capabilities employed in Operation Allied Force, the operation highlighted a number of disparities between U.S. capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike, mobility, and command, control and communications capabilities. The gaps that we confronted were real, and they had the

effect of impeding our ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with our NATO allies.[9] Initial findings indicate a large difference between U.S. capabilities and the rest of NATO. These differences were identified shortly after the war and recognized by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen in a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Coronado, California.

> Individually, many allies are making progress transforming their militaries to meet the missions of the future... Collectively, however, we must make NATO even more effective.
>
> NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative aims to attain this end by calling for more mobile, sustainable forces equipped with efficient, interoperable command and control and communications, more precision-guided munitions, and strong chemical, biological and information warfare defenses...[10]
>
> --Former Secretary of Defense Cohen

The significance of Cohen's speech is that while talking about lessons learned in Kosovo he ties the DCI to NATO military transformation and increased military effectiveness. Although the objectives of the DCI are not specifically defined and described in Cohen's speech, he does make clear what the DCI "aims to attain." Subsequent to his speech in Coronado, Cohen and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Henry Shelton, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee about changes highlighted in an initial Kosovo after-action report released by DoD. The DCI was a subject of this testimony and all five areas of focus were specifically described. The simple fact that the U.S. Secretary of Defense has related lessons learned from the first war to be won by NATO to the requirement for the DCI and described its areas of focus in official testimony not only emphasizes the importance of the DCI, but also adds clarity to its objectives.

In the 31 January, 2000 Department of Defense Report to Congress titled: Kosovo/ Operation Allied Force After-Action Report further clarity and emphasis was placed on the objectives of the DCI. This report concluded that although experience in Operation Allied Force confirmed that the United States and our allies have made significant accomplishments working together, it also made clear that further improvements are necessary. The experience demonstrated the urgent need to pursue the Defense Capabilities Initiative, which heads of state agreed to in 1999 to address the shortcomings of NATO military capabilities. Unless addressed, these disparities will limit NATO's ability to operate as an effective alliance over the long term. Accordingly, the successful implementation of the Defense Capabilities Initiative is a top priority.[11] Stating "that improvements are necessary" and then directly relating these

improvements to "the urgent need to pursue the Defense Capabilities Initiative" adds tremendous emphasis and clarity of purpose to the DCI. This widely read report, referencing the DCI, was subsequently analyzed and utilized in a U.S. Army War College case study of Kosovo.[12]

Additionally the war in Kosovo, Operation Allied Force, was the first war fought by the NATO Alliance. The Alliance won this war and many lessons were learned about what kind of capabilities the Alliance would require in order to engage in future wars, conflicts, or military operations other than war (MOOTW). Although the Alliance had prepared and postured for war for fifty years it had not been required to fight, the strategy of deterrence and defense had been successful. This was the first time that NATO muscles were exercised in a real combat operation. Exercising these muscles, although successful, was also very painful. Any endeavor that is both successful and painful is all too apt to be forgotten because its lessons were painful also. Searching for lessons reminds us of poor judgements, lost opportunities, overstressed emotions, quarrels, and tribulations. Also, deeper issues will inevitably be exposed, issues that require rethinking cherished programs and popular agendas.[13] Operation Allied Force and the lessons that followed emphasized the capabilities required for NATO to conduct successful military operations and allowed a strategic peek at what the future might hold. Searching the lessons exposed issues such as capability shortfalls in effective engagement, deployability and mobility, and command, control and communications. NATO ministers evaluated these capability shortfalls and agreed that the Alliance did indeed have a requirement for these type capabilities. The consistent vision by smart, ambitious military planners of similar requirements had been identified earlier at the Washington Summit and the Alliance had drafted and agreed to their pursuit in the form of the DCI. The lessons from Operation Allied Force, while producing requirements for improvement, also lend credibility and clarity to the DCI by simply reinforcing the overall objectives of the initiative

Can additional NATO initiatives such as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) reinforce the DCI? NATO Allies have been pursuing the ESDI and PfP since 1994 with the Western European Union (WEU) and since 1999 with the European Union (EU) (FIGURE 1). ESDI should mean stronger and more capable European allies-Allies who will be better partners for the U.S. in pursuit of our shared interests and values and better able to contribute to transatlantic security. The success of ESDI, like that of the DCI, is an integral part of equipping the Alliance with the tools and options it will need to deal with the challenges of the new century.[14] An essential part of the development of ESDI is the improvement of European military capabilities. The Alliance's DCI is designed to ensure the

effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full range of NATO missions and will play a crucial role in this process. Objectives arising from the DCI and the efforts of the EU to strengthen European capabilities through the European Security and Defense Posture (ESDP) are also mutually reinforcing.[15] The search for means to enhance capabilities is now a major, and high profile, part of Alliance business.

NATO's force planning process will, for Allies, play a central role in this work. And, just as Alliance Force Goals are now being linked to capabilities identified in the Defense Capabilities Initiative, the overwhelming majority of the Partnership Goals (PfP) have been linked to one or more of the five areas that were addressed as part of the DCI.[16] During discussion and debate these mutually reinforcing initiatives and linked capabilities are often used as examples and evidence in support of each other. Utilization as an example or evidence adds visibility to an initiative or issue and can add refinement as well. Having an evident and constructive connection to other NATO initiatives, such as ESDI and PfP, the DCI objectives are more likely to be discussed, debated, deciphered, and refined. It is obvious that through this relationship with ESDI and PfP the objectives of the DCI are being further clarified and reinforced for the nations of NATO.

**WHAT ARE THE DETRACTORS OF CLARITY?**

WITHIN NATO

With a current Strategic Concept, published and agreed to definitions of capabilities and objectives, SSI's published analysis, recent operational lessons learned (Kosovo) that reinforce requirements and complementary initiatives, the objectives of DCI should be clear to NATO nations, however, detractors are present that blur the transparency of DCI.

In his September 7, 2001 speech in Oslo, Norway General Kernan, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command, stressed the success of a parallel initiative known as Concept Development and Experimentation (CDE). While CDE may be a constructive and noble initiative, negative address of the DCI while positively endorsing a parallel initiative complicates what strategic initiatives to support and blurs the focus of the DCI objectives.

> The current technical investment within NATO and the ability to modernize processes is, in my opinion, insufficient to meet the practical realities of our charter.
>
> Regardless of rhetoric or rationalization, the de facto result of our current way of doing business, suggests to the world, and to each other, that we are

> increasingly willing to gamble with our collective security...seemingly content to ignore the dramatic change to 21st century threats.
>
> The Defense Capabilities Initiative, although forward leaning, is more of an attempt to address current capability shortfalls....a task with which it is struggling mightily.
>
> Unfortunately, despite bold proclamations, defense expenditures of most NATO countries have dropped precipitously in recent years.
>
> The result, according to NATO Defense Ministers by a High-Level Steering Group, is that less than half of the DCI decisions and related Force Goals are planned for full implementation.
>
> That means that we can't do what our political leadership expects us to be able to do. There have been, however, some note worthy successes. The progress of CDE through its first year, for example, has been very encouraging.[17]
>
> --General Kernan

European leaders set on a course of support and implementation of the DCI since 1999 are now faced with criticism of it and high level promotion of a parallel initiative in competition with it. The seemingly lack of support for the DCI signals disapproval or at least less than full support on the part of a senior U.S. leader. Without full support and approval from senior leaders, the objectives of the DCI become fragmented and lose the focus of senior European leaders. It would seem reasonable that after hearing that the DCI was "struggling mightily" and that "the progress of CDE, through its first year has been very encouraging" that senior leaders may tend to question priorities and shift support to CDE, thus sustaining less political support and putting less emphasis on the DCI.

WITHIN THE EU

Leaders of the 15 countries of the EU concluded their semi-annual meeting in Feira, Portugal by approving a series of documents on the EU's defense role. The union is building an autonomous military as well as civilian force, composed of police and judges, to assist with crises on the continent. One of the key sticking points, however, is the EU's relation with NATO, the preeminent military organization in Europe. The EU's proposed capabilities would significantly overlap those of NATO's. Moreover, the EU's plans for a beefed-up military force and a separate intelligence apparatus also promises to profoundly change the nature of decision-making within the North Atlantic Alliance. Furthermore, to make up for its military shortcomings, the EU convened a conference in the fall of 2000 to work out arrangements on how much each member needs to contribute to the EU defense force.[18] The EU's plan to

strengthen Europe's military will no doubt detract from the ability of NATO nations to maintain support for the DCI. Ten nations of the EU are also members of NATO (FIGURE 1). Overlap and competing/dual prioritization concerning roles, capabilities, responsibilities, and the nature of decision making is bound to cause strategic level friction and detract from NATO's ability to pursue the objectives of the DCI. A nation that has been pursuing the objectives of the DCI may now be in conflict with the EU to provide a capability separate and distinct from that of the DCI. Few if any European nations have the resources and political will to pursue dual defense initiatives.

Further detraction is evident as a new U.S. President shapes foreign policy and reacts to the changing nature of the transatlantic relationship. It is unclear what course the Bush administration will chart for transatlantic relations. Inevitably the new administration will have to come to grips with the question of whether the Alliance, in its current form, has a future. U.S. policy makers have been increasingly concerned that the EU's goal of acquiring the capability to pursue an autonomous foreign and security policy, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), will undermine NATO's role as the primary guarantor of European security.[19] The rhetorical disconnect over the roles and missions of NATO vs. the EU in the defense realm , if further exacerbated, could lead to moves by both sides to loosen the traditionally close defense ties between Europe and the U.S.[20] The confusion and detraction here revolves around whether capabilities belonging to the EU are necessarily available for NATO and vice versa, and if the ESDP becomes reality, does it replace NATO? This discussion and debate has gone so far as to generate detracting published analysis that identifies certain supporters of the original Washington Treaty that welcomed the prospect of a truly independent Europe and regarded the U.S. role in NATO as temporary, not permanent.[21] This high level political tension causes confusion, takes time and political maneuvering, and slows the decision process. This creates competition among initiatives and the DCI may not be the one getting the attention. Clarification of the DCI will remain muddled so long as U.S. foreign policy concerning the overall support and survival of NATO is in question.

## ADDITIONAL DETRACTORS

> In absolute terms there is little or no need for the Defense Capabilities Initiative. NATO states have overwhelming technical military superiority over any potential enemy. NATO already outspends any potential enemy enormously. NATO's capacity to wage high intensity warfare is unrivalled. The new capabilities needed are the equipment, training, and doctrine to manage low end peace support operations or verifier missions. Where high tech weaponry is concerned, rather than preparing a new round of military technological build up, NATO nations should be examining arms control and disarmament measures which can

> reduce the vast arsenals existing in Europe, and simultaneously, reduce any potential risk or threat to the Alliance.[22]
>
> --Julianne Smith and Martin Butcher, Basic Publications

Adding obscurity and confusion to the DCI are research recommendations, such as above, published after the NATO Summit. If the DCI is to gain and maintain clarity and if NATO members wish to pursue this initiative such recommendations must be analyzed from a differing perspective and rebutted in the same forum at the same time. Without a differing perspective and rebuttal those in search of clarity for the DCI will lose interest and further pursuit will be stifled. Publications of this nature obscure the clarity of the objectives of the DCI and may in fact impair its full and timely implementation.

Additionally, many European states are preoccupied with internal economic and political issues. This preoccupation could result in difficulty reaching consensus on threats and what kind of economic resources (means) should be allocated to the capabilities required to meet these threats. Preoccupation and lack of consensus has the likely potential to cause divisive debates over interests, objectives, ways and means. Attainment of anything other than the "low hanging fruit" of the DCI may not be forthcoming.

As seen during the NATO response to the crisis in the Balkans in the 1990's, difficulties in forging consensus prolongs decision making, especially when there may be disagreement over interests, objectives, and the ways and means to achieve them.[23] Disagreement over interests, objectives, and the ways and means to achieve them makes decision making more complex and muddles the issue further. Leaders may have thought they were clear on what the objectives of the DCI were and now are having to revisit the issue.

The DCI is two years old and the European members of the Alliance have seen high level leadership endorsement of competing initiatives, pursuit of dual European defense strategies, confusing and frustrated decision making efforts within NATO, and most importantly an unclear U.S. foreign policy concerning transatlantic relations. Although much effort has been put in to clarification of the DCI objectives and no doubt much clarity has been gained, the aforementioned detractors of clarity may have the upper hand. Political will and the application of resources to the DCI will be the bottom line indicators of whether the DCI succeeds or fails.

## ARE THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN THE DCI CONSIDERED A PRIORITY BY THE ALLIANCE?

This question gets to the heart of the Alliance's defense strategy. It considers that the DCI itself is an agreed to priority of the Alliance, and then asks if the objectives set forth in this

program to develop defense capabilities are actually Alliance priorities. In other words the DCI has been accepted as a priority by the heads of the NATO Alliance, but are the objectives of the DCI e.g. deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, survivability, etc. truly priorities of the nations of the Alliance? The answer to this question will be determined by how the nations of the Alliance answer the following five questions. What should the objectives of NATO military transformation be? What kind of missions/wars/engagements should the NATO Alliance be prepared to deter and if necessary, fight and win in the 21st century? What are the appropriate uses of NATO forces short of a major war? How much and what kind of involvement should the Alliance have in small scale contingencies? Will NATO forces and capabilities be capable of engagement outside of recognized NATO boundaries?[24]

WHAT SHOULD THE OBJECTIVES OF NATO MILITARY TRANSFORMATION BE?

NATO military transformation should reflect the changing worldwide strategic landscape. This world-wide strategic landscape can be described as informationally adept and fluid in nature and has accelerated social, political, economic, and cultural changes. These changes along with new regional power relationships, due to the break-up of the Soviet Union, have changed the military requirements of NATO. These requirements can no longer be focused on the Soviet threat and must now be capabilities based. That is to say that NATO military planners no longer have a current enemy with a known order of battle and concept of operations. This former type of enemy or threat fights from organized formations and would normally be met by a force created to counter or defeat the threat. Such was the case during the Cold War. The NATO alliance had a threat based military. The Soviet Union is no longer a threat and Russia is transitioning in its own way to a market democracy. Therefore NATO no longer needs a threat based force.

In order to transform NATO's military, the DCI calls for the improvement, update, and acquisition of specific flexible military capabilities. The NATO Alliance has recognized the requirement for a capabilities based force and the objectives of the DCI are a logical step in the right direction. However, if NATO received a report card on the Defense Capabilities Initiative, the teacher comments might read, "Decent progress. Must try harder." Just over half of the defense requirements listed under the DCI have been met. This has led to significant improvements in NATO defense assets and in the ability to carry out missions, but NATO is still falling short of its goals.[25] NATO realizes the requirement for a capabilities based military and DCI supports this requirement. This is evidence that NATO has prioritized the objectives of

DCI, but must stay vigilant in pursuit of these objectives lest their priority slip and rhetoric replaces progress.

Without a defined threat NATO simply does not know, what is does not know about who, where, when, and why they may have to fight or engage in the future. The objectives of NATO military transformation should therefore be flexible and adaptive and provide a wide array of capabilities... a capabilities based force instead of a threat based force. This type of force postulates solutions, in the form of capabilities, for problems that are potential threats (most likely and most dangerous). A capabilities based military force will focus on the details for defeat of an enemy no matter what he brings to the fight or where, and, more importantly, focuses on critical vulnerabilities and centers of gravity. A capabilities based force will find the enemy's center of gravity and simply apply appropriate capabilities against it in order to produce defeat of the enemy. This type of military force is also suited for asymmetric warfare, has the capability to rapidly deploy, is scenario driven, includes an analysis driven threat assessment (capabilities based, but recognizes importance of knowing your enemy/engagement environment), and constitutes an on-call pool of capability sets.[26]

## WHAT KIND OF MISSIONS/WARS/ENGAGEMENTS SHOULD THE NATO ALLIANCE BE PREPARED TO DETER AND IF NECESSARY, FIGHT AND WIN IN THE 21ST CENTURY?

Deterrence of threats was NATO's strategy before the late 1990's. This strategy was based on the doctrines of flexible response and forward defense. To sustain an effective deterrence policy, the NATO allies could not permit a potential aggressor to believe that it could choose a level of conflict and not risk a NATO military response at a higher level of hostilities. Taking into account the multitude of missions/wars/engagements (MWE) that NATO may be called upon to conduct in the 21st century, deterrence will require intensified defense cooperation among allies while ensuring that such cooperation increases the West's security and political cohesion and contributes to prospects for the improvement of East-West relations and arms control.[27]

> Alliance security must take account of the global context and that NATO must be capable of responding to multifaceted and multi-directional risks if stability in Europe is to be preserved.
>
> Direct defense of Allies' territory remains the core function of NATO. But "new missions" also serve to advance our security at home. By operating to shape the security environment-including where appropriate, operations beyond Allies' territory- we will reduce the risks to our territory and populations over the long term.

> We are fortunate in that we do not face a large-scale threat today- a "peer competitor" in military terms. But we cannot guarantee against having to do so in the future.[28]
>
> --Former Secretary of Defense Cohen

What former Secretary of Defense Cohen said above is to be ready for almost any kind of conflict almost anywhere. Risks to NATO will be unpredictable and multidirectional.[29] Although "Direct defense of Allies' territory" is the core function of NATO, new missions such as peace keeping, peace making, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, ethnic and religious conflict containment, and territorial disputes should all be MWE that NATO is prepared to deter and if necessary fight and win. Additional MWE include security concerns such as; existence outside the alliance of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery, the possibility of a large scale conventional aggressor emerging in the 21st century, and terrorism. Adopting a common operational vision, examining current military shortfalls and then launching a program to improve and develop capabilities, in order to nullify perceived shortfalls, is a viable route to counter unpredictable and multidirectional risks. Although not ranked as a numbered priority, the DCI makes specific reference to 21st century missions and changing Allied military needs. The DCI is NATO's program to improve and develop capabilities to meet 21st century MWE requirements and as such is considered a priority.

## WHAT ARE THE APPROPRIATE USES OF NATO FORCES SHORT OF A MAJOR WAR?

Developed above is a lengthy list of possible requirements for NATO capabilities in the conduct of defense and security. Today, of particular significance on this list of possibilities is the use of NATO capabilities to respond to terrorism. Following its decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington treaty (an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all), the NATO allies agreed to take eight measures, individually and collectively to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism. These eight measures include: intelligence sharing, as appropriate and according to their capabilities; assistance to allies that may be subject to increased terrorist threats; security for facilities of the U.S. and other allies; backfill for allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that are required for out of area operations; blanket over flight clearances for the U.S. and other allies' aircraft for military flights related to operations against terrorism; access for the U.S. and other allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO for operations against terrorism. The Alliance is also ready to deploy elements of its standing Naval forces and its NATO Airborne Early Warning force.

These collective actions made Article 5 of the Washington Treaty operational.[30] Although this is just one example of the kinds of war the alliance will fight in the future, each of the collective actions mentioned in the decision to invoke Article 5 is an example of the appropriate use of NATO forces short of a major war. Additionally each action can be related in one way or another to the capabilities identified for focus in the DCI. For instance, intelligence sharing can relate directly to effective engagement in that if allies were to share intelligence that they would not have normally shared, forces may gain the ability to engage more effectively and with appropriate assets. Blanket over flight clearances and access to ports and airfields relates directly to deployability and mobility, the ability to move forces efficiently and effectively.

These expanded NATO options in the campaign against terrorism are examples of the appropriate uses of NATO forces short of a major war. Constant analysis (Is NATO achieving DCI objectives?) and the final outcome (Did NATO use the DCI capabilities?) of this campaign/war will prove if the objectives of the DCI are a high enough priority to be completely attained.

## DOES THE DCI PROVIDE THE CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT SMALL SCALE CONTINGENCIES?

In order to analyze this question small-scale contingencies (SSC) must be understood by the alliance.

> ...swift intervention by military forces may be the best way to contain, resolve, or mitigate the consequences of a conflict that could otherwise become far more costly and deadly. These operations encompass the full range of joint military operations beyond peacetime engagement activities but short of major theater warfare and include: show-of-force operations, interventions, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations, no-fly zone enforcement, peace enforcement, maritime sanctions enforcement, counterterrorism operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.[31]
>
> --Military Analysis Network

Small-Scale Contingency (SSC) operations cover the full spectrum of operations beyond Stability and Support Operations (SASO) but short of Major Theater War (MTW).[32] Additionally a relationship exists between NATO's most recent Strategic Concept, which identifies fundamental tasks relating to security, consultation and territorial defense, crisis management, and Partnerships, and the spectrum of war beyond SASO and short of MTW. The relationship is that security, consultation, crisis management, and Partnerships easily fall between SASO and MTW and can therefore be considered SSCs. Furthermore, all of these "fundamental tasks" reflect non-Article 5/ non-traditional type responsibilities and are above and beyond the

responsibilities included in the 1991Strategic Concept. Through consensus decision making, crisis management (conflict prevention) and Partnership were added to the new NATO Strategic Concept (1999). These added tasks caused debates at the 1999 Summit which also created dialogue on the size, structure, and composition of NATO's armed forces. In the debate over size, structure, and composition the emphasis was on forces that would be deployable, mobile and flexible, and sustainable. Additional emphasis was placed on the forces being equipped with modern, lethal, and highly accurate weapons systems. These are exactly the capabilities which the UK had emphasized in its Strategic Defense Review the previous year, and which NATO itself was seeking to promote through the DCI. The result was the endorsement of the need to shift structures and capabilities yet further from static defense towards the requirements of deployed operations-requirements which the Kosovo campaign has also underlined.[33] Early NATO military engagement combined with political, economic, and informational efforts can achieve desired results, however allowing a crisis to continue may negate the ability or capabilities of a nation to engage later.

SSC's present foreign policy or civil policy and force structure challenges. The variety of the type (s) of SSCs that may be encountered will require military planners to task organize forces to meet the specific SSC. Task organization will normally require engagement in combined or coalition forces that are involved with civilian personnel from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), and regional and international organizations (IOs). Appropriate capabilities will be the key to securing success in SSC engagement. Not simply the capability to shoot, move, and communicate, NATO military forces will have to have the capability to constantly know where they can engage direct and indirect fire systems and not hit or threaten NGOs, PVOs, and IOs. They must be able to talk, via communications systems, with coalition partners and civilian agencies and they may be required to provide certain capabilities, such as mobility or survivability, to coalition and civilian partners. Some SSCs will require only a few NATO military personnel, possibly as observers; some SSCs will require robust NATO military capabilities, ready for combat; some SSCs will be nonmilitary, and simply require NATO military assistance in disaster relief, consequence management, humanitarian assistance etc.

SSCs are hard to rigidly define, but normally include some characteristics that distinguish them from major theater war (MTW) or high intensity conflict (HIC). These characteristics include: decisions to engage tend to be made over short periods of time and may not provide much time for planning, preparation or deployment; they may last much longer than originally planned; little infrastructure may be available in the deployment area for receiving and staging of

forces and supplies; requirements for mobility, less firepower, and reduced use of attack aircraft and standoff weapons; rules of engagement (ROE) highlighting avoidance of casualties; and the need for dialogue and cooperation with local power brokers. [34] The size, readiness, availability and deployment of NATO's military forces will be a direct reflection of its obligation to collective defense and to conduct crisis response operations, sometimes on short notice, away from normal alliance boundaries.[35] If NATO is going to engage in SSCs, and indications are that they have and will continue to do so, the DCI will provide capabilities to bring success to the Alliance.

## WILL NATO FORCES AND CAPABILITIES BE CAPABLE OF ENGAGEMENT OUTSIDE OF RECOGNIZED NATO BOUNDARIES?

If history is any indicator, nations of the alliance will be called upon to engage outside of NATO recognized boundaries on a regular basis. The Gulf War, for instance, included significant NATO forces and recently Great Britain was asked by the U.S. to help prepare military strikes against Somalia in the next phase of the global campaign against terrorism. Additionally Allied naval vessels from Germany, and France have joined U.S. ships around the Arabian Peninsula, patrolling possible al Qa'eda escape routes from Afghanistan. This type of force deployability and mobility is a true function of the readiness of forces, their training, organizational structure and equipment. However, not all NATO allies are capable of these type of out of area missions. Legal hurdles to deploying conscript forces outside national boundaries, combined with the requirement for highly skilled and therefore longer serving troops mean that force deployability is more easily achieved by professional armies. Many NATO nations have a professional deployable force, but others have traditionally had conscript forces and here the past few years have seen significant changes.

The French, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and Spain are all either changing the composition of their militaries by increasing the proportion of professional forces or have plans to do so over the next few years. The Czech Republic and Hungary plan to eliminate or reduce conscription once they are in a financial position to do so, and Poland recently announced its intention to reduce and professionalize half its forces by 2003.[36]

Further considerations to engaging NATO forces outside of recognized NATO boundaries is the organizational restructuring of professional forces into more rapidly deployable units which are still highly lethal. Here again there have been significant developments over the past few years. The United Kingdom, France, U.S. and several other NATO nations including Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and Turkey have also restructured over the past decade to increase deployability.[37]

To fully execute deployability, forces must also be mobile. They must have mobile fighting and support transport that are lethal and survivable and capable of self contained short intertheater movement. Many NATO nations have equipped or plan to equip their crisis reaction forces with light armored vehicles (LAV). These LAVs are lighter than a main battle tank and can be transported by air in greater numbers and are more versatile on the ground. But, they do not offer the same levels of troop protection and firepower as a main battle tank and, as a result, NATO nations continue to upgrade or field new tanks. The U.S. is most inclined to shift from a heavy to a lighter, more mobile and deployable ground force. By contrast, European investment programs continue to maintain heavier armored vehicles, such as tanks, self-propelled howitzers and artillery.[38] Until technology catches up and allows for a more survivable LAV or produces another armor killing system, which may be asymmetric, tanks will still be procured and often times not deployed outside of local areas. An evident incentive for lighter, lethal platforms is the infrastructure (road system and bridges) in areas where NATO forces might be engaged. Tanks are heavy, the M1 Abrams is 70 tons, and many roads and bridges outside of recognized NATO boundaries cannot safely handle this load.

The additional and most important capability of a deployable and mobile force is getting to the engagement. In most cases this involves strategic air and sealift. Here, Canada and the European NATO members lag far behind the U.S. The U.S. conducts almost all of NATO's long-range air transport of troops and "outsize" equipment. Measures are being taken to address this shortfall and several European members of NATO have taken positive action or plan to in the near future (before about 2007).[39] This is exactly what the DCI is all about and it is evident that realizing the requirement to conduct missions outside of NATO's recognized boundaries is helping prioritize the objectives of the DCI. However, although progress has been made not all NATO nations realize that the DCI, by increasing deployability and operating outside recognized boundaries, can actually add to their overall security by preventing the spread of conflict to their neighbors, maintaining economic stability and trade, and adding credibility to their part in the alliance. As General Wesley Clark says in his book Waging Modern War, "Credibility is the ultimate measure of value for states and international institutions." NATO force capabilities will continue to increase and improve.

However, without increased individual and alliance priority on the objectives of the DCI the time frame for their attainment is "not in the near future". Transformations costs, political will, and social awareness are not currently aligned to achieve these objectives of the DCI. The Alliance must realize that until the objectives identified for focus in the DCI are attained, engagement outside of recognized NATO boundaries will be limited and credibility will be in

question. This capability deficiency threatens Alliance ability to protect their nations from threats that can come from great distances at any time

**WHAT KIND OF MANAGEMENT AND STRUCTURE IS PROVIDED FOR ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE DCI?**

The DCI's primary vehicle for management and structure was established at the Washington Summit in 1999. A High Level Steering Group (HLSG) was established to oversee implementation of the DCI and to manage, prioritize and harmonize the efforts of NATO's defense-related committees. Although specific address of the DCI objectives is conducted by other NATO committees e.g. NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A); Senior NATO Logisticians' Conference (SNLC) etc., NATO's HLSG oversees this committee process. Monitoring of the individual DCI objectives remains with the nations and the appropriate NATO bodies and authorities. However, the HLSG has been focused on looking at specific objectives in-depth, considering relevant policy issues, and overall monitoring of all the DCI objectives.

To date the HLSG has accomplished the following: created the opportunity to focus high level attention on the DCI and, through identified goals and time frames, has created a heightened sense of purpose and urgency; reviewed objectives in each of the five core capability areas; ensured that NATO committees impacting the DCI have reorganized with a philosophy of fulfilling the DCI objectives as one of their highest priorities; created synergy between NATO defense planning committees; forced NATO committees to work together to produce common solutions to the DCI objectives; and forced long delayed decisions. Generally speaking the HLSG has been an expediter on the following: timelines for projects; establishment of working groups; questionnaires issued and replied to; studies to be launched; and temporary personnel assignments.[40]

The HLSG has also examined specific objectives in depth. For example: Sustainability and Logistics has met the initial goals set at the 1999 Washington Summit. The Multi-national Joint Logistics Center (MJLC) has been identified as a priority and, when implemented, will increase efficiency and effectiveness of deployed NATO forces. Deployability and Mobility are evidently the hardest objectives to attain and individual nations need to do much more. A C3 architecture will be developed by the end of 2002. Effective Engagement has also been prioritized in order to enable the attainment of the capability for NATO forces to suppress enemy air defenses and to acquire and deploy precision guided munitions (PGM), PGMs are a high priority for NATO and the DCI. Additionally, the HLSG is starting to examine the DCI objectives

of Survivability and has related the importance of this objective to the threat of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

> The HLSG has also received input from nations, expressing their specific views on the five implementation areas of the DCI and, in some cases, describing in detail how they intend to implement the specific objectives. These give insights on the further development of the DCI. Countries participating in collective defense planning—all Allies except France—further information on their plans within the defense planning process. Nevertheless, the information so far available does not provide a sufficiently comprehensive picture of national implementation activities. Allies have discussed ways of gathering additional data on national efforts in the coming months.[41]

--Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, The Honorable Franklin D. Kramer

The HLSG also examines policy issues impacting on the attainment of the DCI objectives. The policy issue under primary examination is the application of resources. The DCI's success relies on the application of sufficient resources and leadership is the key to applying the appropriate resources to defense budgets in support of the DCI. Yet leadership is lacking in this arena and unresponsive defense budgets (resources) continue to erode. While Allies acknowledge their capability shortfalls, few have made concrete efforts towards negating the shortfalls by increasing their defense budgets. In fact, defense spending has been cut by several key Allies.[42] The function of the HLSG is to monitor these deficiencies and apply convincing arguments to national leaders in order to reduce deficiencies and seek attainment of the objectives of the DCI. To the credit of the HLSG, deficiencies, such as this, that will cause the failure of the DCI are recognized and addressed. However, the HLSG has no authority to enforce the pursuit of the objectives of the DCI and, although deficiencies are recognized and addressed, enforcement is a national responsibility and is not being done.

NATO's HLSG has been instrumental in accomplishing coordination of responsible bodies, each of who have a vital piece of the DCI objectives. However, actual improvement in military capabilities will only be realized if work, actions, and resources are combined to produce an appropriate conclusion and the desired result. Work, actions, and resources are not being combined appropriately. The HLSG does not have the authority to drive these combinations because NATO does not conduct business that way. These combinations are a national function and responsibility. The HLSG is realistic in its expectations and does not expect what it does not inspect and thus the HLSG will continue to monitor all of the objectives and recommend further actions as required. And although the HLSG has been successful in

managing and structuring numerous DCI objectives in the right direction, many others still require rudder guidance.

The structure of the HLSG is well suited for managing and monitoring attainment of the objectives of the DCI. It is also instrumental in identifying problems with execution and nation states responsible. However, it lacks the power to correct these problems and direct the major muscle movements required for attainment of the DCI objectives. Without the strength of enforcement and direction authority the HLSG does not have the power to ensure detailed pursuit and attainment of the objectives of the DCI.

**ARE THE MONETARY RESOURCES REQUIRED TO ATTAIN THE OBJECTIVES OF THE DCI BEING APPLIED?**

Attainment of the objectives of the DCI will require resources. Some of these resources can be realized through resource realignment and reprioritization, however, for many NATO nations, realization of the objectives of the DCI will require increased defense spending. While the member nations of NATO are relatively wealthy, publics and governments may find little reason to increase spending on military capabilities. However, governments are also responsible to their public to present the facts of an unsure strategic global environment. They have done this in the form of the Alliance's Strategic Concept. Although the world has not experienced actual world-wide war since World War II and even though huge militaries were built and postured during the Cold War, this type of threat no longer exists. The world no longer faces military engagement like that found in WW II and prepared for during the Cold War. Military scholars refer to this period as a strategic pause. During this strategic pause, from approximately 1990 to present, the defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) of all NATO nations, except Turkey, has been reduced. The NATO average of defense spending as a percentage of GDP in the year 1990 was 3.1 percent, in 2000 it was 2.2 (table 1). The percentage spent on defense measures a country's overall effort, regardless of how it allocates its defense budget. Importantly, between 1990 and 2000 NATO's Defense spending per capita was reduced by over forty percent (table 2.).[43] During this same time period Social Protection Expenditures in the EU were increasing (table 3). Obviously resources that could be used for Defense spending, and the objectives of the DCI, are being used for Social Protection programs. As is evident in tables 1,2 and 3 NATO's overall effort on defense spending is slipping. Unless the nations of NATO curtail this downward trend in defense spending as a percentage of GDP and Per Capita it is likely that the objectives of the DCI will not receive the resources required for attainment. A 1998 Brookings Institution study found that EU defense spending, then two thirds of the US total, yielded a mere 10 percent of America's

deployable effective capability. The main change since then is that the US will soon be spending nearly three times as much as the EU – which is at least equally vulnerable to attack.[44]

The requirement for the objectives of the DCI was initially defined at the Washington Summit in April 1999. These same requirements were reinforced in Operation Allied Force. It would not be prudent for the nations of NATO to wait until these requirements arise again to realize they do not have the desired/required capabilities. Although accepting this risk may seem appropriate to some, history tells us that this strategic pause will not last forever and the objectives of the DCI will be needed sooner than later. Taking advantage of this strategic pause and increasing defense spending to attain the objectives of the DCI will enable NATO to meet the next military engagement in the fashion visualized by its leaders. However, if effort and resources are not applied to the objectives of the DCI, NATO could engage militarily and be defeated or simply broker a draw due to the lack of capability. A draw could mean the same as defeat for the Alliance.

**CONCLUSION**

The DCI has been clarified to the nations of the Alliance through a Strategic Concept, agreed upon definitions, institutional support, and the lessons learned in an operational military victory. However, many detractors such as competing initiatives, bureaucratic decision making, and unclear U.S. foreign policy, continue to muddle and blur efforts to achieve the objectives of the DCI. These detractors of the DCI are not perceived as temporary or subsiding and may be increasing as political tensions between the U.S. and Europe increase over foreign policy issues. Without continued focus the objectives of the DCI will wither and risk being forgotten. However, the objectives of the DCI are considered a priority by the Alliance. This is evident through many simultaneous efforts: transformation of NATO's military; preparation for new missions, wars, and engagements; new uses for NATO forces short of major war, to include SSCs; and the pursuit of capabilities to engage outside of recognized NATO boundaries. Additionally, the HLSG continues to monitor the progress of attainment of the objectives of the DCI and makes suggestions and applies force and pressure where possible. However, it must be remembered that the HLSG has no enforcement capability and that enforcement is a national responsibility. Without enforcement authority the HLSG may not be sufficient to drive the DCI objectives in the right direction.

Furthermore, national defense spending trends are evidence that the resources required for attainment of the objectives of the DCI are being reduced. Reduced resources cause

reprioritization of military requirements which slows or stops the process of capabilities attainment. Reduced defense spending will slow attainment of the objectives of the DCI and may cause non-attainment of critical capabilities.

Overall increased defense spending and DCI enforcement authority (HLSG could be delegated authority) will have the most positive impact and can propel the Alliance to attainment of its objectives. Although, if defense spending continues to decrease (tables 1 and 2) and pursuit and attainment of the objectives of the DCI is not enforced, the objectives will be recognized as political rhetoric and never attained. This would mean failure for the DCI.

> And NATO? Indispensable, of course. As...er..."the only alliance capable of articulating the values of the way we live". An attendant lord, there to swell a pageant, but no longer at the cutting edge of Western power.[45]
>
> --Rosemary Righter, London Times

NATO's DCI is intended to increase Alliance military capabilities while at the same time narrowing the gap between U.S. NATO military capabilities and European NATO military capabilities. While NATO's DCI is "struggling mightily" the U.S. military is transforming. Specifically, the Army's Objective Force will be a responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable force. This force is based on capabilities supported by leading edge technology focusing on four criteria. First, the Objective Force will be soldier centered. Soldiers will be intrinsically equipped (gear to handle multiple types of missions) and integrated with leap ahead technology that provides internetted air, ground, and space situational awareness and lethality capabilities. This will allow dominance across the spectrum of military operations. Second, the Objective Force will capitalize on technologies that enable it to employ precision engagement with significant improvements in lethality, range, and accuracy. Third, the objective Force will acquire the speed and agility in positioning and repositioning to ensure the joint team dominates land maneuvers. Fourth, the Objective Force will serve as a strong deterrent to potential adversaries by providing the nation greater flexibility through broader range of strategic options.[46]

This Objective Force is meant to continue the increase in U.S. military capability, and unless the objectives of the DCI are fully attained, and sometime in the near future, the military capability gap between the U.S. NATO and European NATO forces will increase. If the U.S. portion of NATO is currently more militarily capable than the European portion of NATO then attainment of the Objective Force and marginal attainment of the DCI will further increase the military capabilities gap. This is the type of strategic gap that a wily adversary can exploit to his advantage.

Synergy (the combined action of two or more assets that is greater than the sum of the action of one of the assets used alone) is the key to application of military powers for any alliance or coalition. Being able to utilize all of the Alliance's assets, simultaneously, at any time, against multiple targets, for an indefinite period is the ideal synergy of capabilities. But without complementary capabilities or capabilities on the same operational scale synergy cannot be exploited. If the NATO Alliance cannot synergize its capabilities because of different levels of military improvement, the enemy can take advantage of this "open flank". Lack of synergy becomes a vulnerability and a weakness that the enemy will seek to exploit in his pursuit of the Alliance center of gravity.

Lacking synergy the Alliance will have to accept more risk. Accepting more risk means being less capable of conducting the same type missions NATO has conducted in the recent past and being less capable of conducting missions against new and differing threats. NATO is currently accepting some risk due to the capabilities gap between NATO U.S. and NATO Europe. Unless the objectives of the DCI are fully attained the gap in military capabilities between the U.S. and NATO Europe will grow exponentially as the U.S. Army Objective Force is brought to bear. As the gap increases so does the risk and the risk is to NATO credibility, lives, resources, and economies. Evidence presented in this paper indicates that many in NATO are willing to accept this risk.

It is entirely possible that without the capabilities identified in the DCI that the U.S. will be required to take on more of Europe's defense and security. European leaders are confronted with resource decisions linking social protection and national security and defense. Current trends suggest that Europe is willing is accept risk in security and defense as a bill payer for social programs. This is a clear prioritization of public policy over defense policy. Without a balance of the two, that includes more and better defense spending, future security and defense will depend more and more on the U.S. It is not clear whether the Alliance can hold up under this burden without fracturing, social upheaval, and creating global/regional security and stability concerns.





FIGURE 1. NATO-19, PFP-45, EU-15, WEU-10, EU-21

**DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN SELECTED YEARS, 1980-2000**

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000[a] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Belgium | 3.3 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| Canada | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.2 |
| Czech Republic[b] | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Denmark | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 |
| France | 4.0 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| Germany | 3.3 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Greece | 5.7 | 7.1 | 5.8 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.9 |
| Hungary[b] | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 1.6 | 1.7 |
| Italy | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| Luxembourg | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| Netherlands | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.6 |
| Norway | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 1.9 |
| Poland[b] | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Portugal | 3.5 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| Spain[c] | n.a. | 2.7 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| Turkey | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.9 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 5.4 | 6.0 |
| United Kingdom | 5.0 | 5.3 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.4 |
| United States | 5.1 | 6.7 | 5.7 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| NATO Average | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| NATO European Average[d] | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

NOTES: n.a. = not applicable.

Averages are weighted by GDP.

Iceland is excluded because it has no armed forces.

a. Estimated by NATO on the basis of available data.

b. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic did not join NATO until 1999.

c. Spain did not join NATO until 1982.

d. Excludes the United States and Canada.

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TABLE 1. DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP

**DEFENSE SPENDING PER CAPITA IN SELECTED YEARS, 1980-2000 (In 1995 U.S. Dollars)**

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000[a] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Belgium | 619 | 613 | 597 | 438 | 431 | 426 | 423 | 426 | 427 |
| Canada | 306 | 386 | 387 | 309 | 278 | 257 | 277 | 285 | 265 |
| Czech Republic[b] | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 115 | 120 |
| Denmark | 613 | 619 | 641 | 596 | 591 | 595 | 594 | 587 | 567 |
| France | 821 | 888 | 910 | 822 | 803 | 802 | 776 | 780 | 785 |
| Germany | 859 | 895 | 892 | 504 | 495 | 481 | 482 | 490 | 484 |
| Greece | 452 | 576 | 504 | 484 | 516 | 542 | 587 | 609 | 633 |
| Hungary[b] | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 84 | 91 |
| Italy | 324 | 365 | 387 | 338 | 340 | 336 | 343 | 350 | 343 |
| Luxembourg | 240 | 265 | 330 | 345 | 354 | 375 | 397 | 399 | 397 |
| Netherlands | 581 | 628 | 631 | 518 | 524 | 517 | 509 | 529 | 500 |
| Norway | 699 | 841 | 887 | 805 | 809 | 793 | 840 | 831 | 809 |
| Poland[b] | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 83 | 85 |
| Portugal | 217 | 204 | 264 | 269 | 260 | 265 | 255 | 267 | 273 |
| Spain[c] | n.a. | 262 | 248 | 221 | 215 | 217 | 212 | 213 | 225 |
| Turkey | 83 | 80 | 106 | 107 | 113 | 117 | 119 | 123 | 136 |
| United Kingdom | 778 | 860 | 768 | 577 | 578 | 541 | 546 | 534 | 526 |
| United States | 1,144 | 1,467 | 1,423 | 1,061 | 1,002 | 985 | 950 | 947 | 968 |
| NATO Average | 758 | 905 | 886 | 670 | 645 | 634 | 621 | 582 | 589 |
| NATO European Average[d] | 547 | 582 | 573 | 447 | 443 | 435 | 433 | 394 | 394 |

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

NOTES: n.a. = not applicable.

Iceland is excluded because it has no armed forces.

Calculations are based on weighted averages.

a. Estimated by NATO on the basis of available data.

b. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic did not join NATO until 1999.

c. Spain did not join NATO until 1982.

d. Excludes the United States and Canada.

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TABLE 2. DEFENSE SPENDING PER CAPITA

**EU Social protection expenditures as a percent of GDP in selected years, 1990-2000**

| GDP | YEAR |
|---|---|
| 1990 | 25.4 |
| 1991 | 26.6 |
| 1992 | 27.9 |
| 1993 | 29.0 |
| 1994 | 28.7 |
| 1995 | 28.5 |
| 1996 | 28.7 |
| 1997 | 28.2 |
| 1998 | 28.4 |
| 1999 | 28.0 |
| 2000 | 28.9 |

[49]

TABLE 3. EU SOCIAL PROTECTION EXPENDITURES

WORD COUNT-11, 355

## ENDNOTES

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[15] "The European Security and Defense Identity; Evolution of the ESDI," NATO Handbook: Evolution of the ESDI Online 02 October 2001; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm; Internet; accessed 23 October 2001.

[16] Frank Boland, "Further Steps in PARP," 20/21 January 2000; available from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pfpdc/documants/2000/Planning_Symposium_Oberammergau/Boland.html; Internet; accessed 7 September 2001.

[17] William F. Kernan, General USA, Remarks on "Concept Development and Experimentation: The Fusion of Effort," News About U.S. Joint Forces Command Online September 2001; available from http://www.jfcom.mil/NewsLink.StoryArchive/pa091001.htm; Internet; accessed 23 October 2001. This quote comes from several separate paragraphs of the publication on pages two, three, and five. They are not connected in the context, but address the same point that processes for modernization, to include DCI, within NATO are insufficient or misguided.

[18] Tomas Valasek, "Redesigning NATO at Feira," The Center for Defense Information: Weekly Defense Monitor Online 22 June 2000; available from http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2000/issue25.html; Internet; accessed 13 November 2001.

[19] Christopher Layne, "Death Knell for NATO? The Bush Administration Confronts the European Security and Defense Policy," Cato Policy Analysis No. 394 Online 04 April 2001; available from http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-394es.html; Internet; accessed 13 November 2001.

[20] "George W. Bush: The First 100 Days, " The Center for Defense Information, News Analysis Online 02 May 2001; available from http://www.cdi.org/press/press050201bush100.html; Internet; accessed 03 December 2001. This article in Chapter 6 also discusses the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. missile defense plans, and the possible withdrawal by the U.S. from the ABM treaty. All of which are detractors from the clarity and emphasis of the objectives of the DCI.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Julianne Smith and Martin Butcher, eds, "A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO," Basic Publications Online January 1999; available from http://www.basicint.org/natorr4.htm; Internet; accessed 15 October 2001.

[23] Stephen J. Blank, William T. Johnsen, Thomas-Durrell Young, " Potential Obstacles To The Future Vision Of Europe," EUROPEAN SECURITY: Washington's Shaping Strategy In Action; Strategic Studies Institute (March 2000): 14.

[24] Michele A. Flournoy, eds., QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices For America's Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001), 11, 13, 16, 17. The five questions used to analyze the priorities of the DCI objectives are derived from the questions used in this book to analyze the strategic priorities of the U.S. military. This type/form of

analysis was recommended by Michele Flournoy during her lecture (question and answer period) to the USAWC on 15 October 2001.

[25] Jim Garamone, "More Work Needed on Defense Capabilities Initiative," Defense Link; American Forces Information Service News Articles Online 5 December 2000; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi; Internet; accessed 22 August 2001.

[26] David Jablonsky, "TIME'S CYCLE AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change," Strategic Studies Institute, (1 June 1995): 52. This analysis is adapted from the book as noted and from conversation with David Jablonsky concerning the definitions of a threat based military vs. a capabilities based military.

[27] Stanley R. Sloan, eds., NATO in the 1990's (Pergamon-Brasseys, International Defense Publishers, Inc, 1989), 3, 14.

[28] Cohen, William; Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Remarks at the Informal Defense Ministerial Meeting, Vilamoura, Portugal; Taking Stock of the Alliance's Defense Capabilities: 24 September 1998: pg. 1,6.

[29] Ibid. pg. 1.

[30] Colonel Alexander Gerry, Aus (ret), "War Against Terrorism: Radical Departure for NATO," Reserve Officers Association National Security Report November 2001: 28-29.

[31] "Smaller-Scale Contingency (SSC), Small-Scale Contingency (SSC), Small-Scale Conflict (SSC) 2001," Military Analysis Network Online March 2001; available from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/ssc.htm; Internet; accessed 05 December 2001.

[32] Ibid.

[33] "NATO's new strategic concept 2000," Defence Systems Daily Online January 2000; available from http://defense-data.com/features/fpage35.html; Internet; accessed 03 December 2001.

[34] "1998 Strategic Assessment, Engaging Power for Peace, Chapter Ten, 1998," National Defense University Online Undated; available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa98/sa98ch10.html; Internet; accessed 05 December 2001.

[35] Office of Information and Press. THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT, THE READERS GUIDE TO THE NATO SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON (NATO-1110 Brussels, Belgium 23-25 April 1999), 56.

[36] Elinor Sloan, "Speeding Deployment," NATO Review (Spring 2001): 30,31.

[37] Ibid. 30.

[38] Ibid. 32.

[39] Ibid. 32.

[40] "Testimony of The Honorable Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense For International Security Affairs, To the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on European Affairs," Office of International Information Programs Online March 2000; available from http://www.mkogy.hu/nato/2000/00an11.htm; Internet; accessed 06 December 2001.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] "NATO Burdensharing After Enlargement, PAST AND PRESENT TRENDS IN BURDEN SHARING," Congressional Budget Office Online August 2001; available from http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2976&sequence=5&from=1; Internet; accessed 02 December 2001. Defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product measures the portion of a country's overall economy that it devotes to defense. It indicates the burden that defense places on the economy of each country, automatically adjusting for differences in national income. The percentage of GDP spent on defense also measures a country's overall effort, regardless of how it allocates its defense budget—some countries may spend more on personnel and have larger troop strength, whereas others may focus on training, equipment modernization, or research. Defense spending as a measure of per capita measures how much a country devotes to defense relative to the size of its population. Residents of wealthier countries generally contribute more to the alliance's total defense spending even though they may devote a smaller portion of their income to that purpose.

[44] Rosemary Righter, "The Insanity of Europe's Farewell to Arms," London Times (21 February 2002): 3.

[45] Ibid. 1.

[46] Lieutenant General John M. Riggs, USA, "What's the Objective Force," Army AL&T November-December 2001: 3.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Various sources to include: "Social protection expenditures as a percent of GDP," The Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child, Youth and Family Policies at Columbia University; "Social spending in EU Member States," European Review Issue 5; "Europe's Welfare States Will Be The Achilles' Heel Of The Single Currency," Media Briefings; "Ireland Spends Less on Social Protection," Irish Times, 06082001; all sources are available online through EUROSTAT, Social Protection Expenditures in the EU, or Social Protection queries; Internet; accessed 03 February 2002.

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